A Secure Self-synchronized Stream Cipher by Daneshgar, Amir & Mohebbipoor, Fahimeh
A Secure Self-synchronized Stream Cipher
Amir Daneshgar∗
Department of Mathematical Sciences
Sharif University of Technology
P.O. Box 11155–9415, Tehran, Iran.
Fahimeh Mohebbipoor
Faculty of Mathematics and Computer Science
Kharazmi University
P.O. Box 15719-14911, Tehran, Iran.
Abstract
We follow two main objectives in this article. On the one hand, we introduce a security
model called LORBACPA+ for self-synchronized stream ciphers which is stronger than
the blockwise LOR-IND-CPA, where we show that standard constructions as delayed
CBC or similar existing self-synchronized modes of operation are not secure in this
stronger model. Then, on the other hand, following contributions of G. Mille´rioux
et.al., we introduce a new self-synchronized stream cipher and prove its security in
LORBACPA+ model.
1 Introduction
Analysis and design of stream ciphers is a classic and among the oldest subjects in cryptog-
raphy, however, amazingly, there are still some challenging problems to be addressed by the
experts in the field (e.g. see [6, 15]).
Among these interesting and challenging problems one may recall the analysis and design
of self-synchronized stream ciphers where despite the efforts made so far, there does not exist
a deep understanding of design methods, analysis and security models for this kind of stream
ciphers yet.
1.1 Main results
Although, it is hopeless to think of CCA secure self-synchronized stream ciphers because of
their error-correction properties, we show that it is possible to design such systems which
are secure in quite stronger models than the classical CPA setting. Our main contribution
in this article is to propose such a self-synchronized stream cipher along with the security
model.
Before we proceed, it is instructive to note that our results are based on three fundamental
contributions in cryptography.
On the one hand, not only our security model are built on the basic contribution of
Bellare, Desai, Jokipii and Rogaway in [2] who introduced the concept of left-or-right indis-
tinguishability (LOR− IND) but also we adopt their fundamental approach for the method
of security proof in Section 4.
∗Correspondence should be addressed to daneshgar@sharif.ir.
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On the other hand, we will basically adopt the notion of blockwise security introduced
independently by Joux, Martinet and Valette [12] and Bellare, Kohno and Namprempre [4]
(also see [5, 9, 10, 13] for the background) since our self-synchronized stream cipher can be
considered as an extension of modes of operation for block-ciphers.
Although, the adaption of these ideas are crucial in our contribution, but our system
would not be secure without applying basic ideas from what G. Mille´rioux et.al. has done
on connecting the design principles of self-synchronized stream cipher to basic concepts of
synchronized control systems (see [16], [17] and references therein).
The canonical form of a Self-Synchronizing Stream Cipher (an SSSC in short) is made
of a combination of a shift register, which acts as a state register with the ciphertext as
input, together with a filtering function that provides the running key stream and an output
function which combines the running key stream with plaintext to produce the cipher text.
In particular, it is known that such canonical SSSC’s are IND− CPA secure under some
conditions on the filtering function [3, 8].
As a matter of fact, using the control-theoretic approach of G. Mille´rioux et.al., we
have been able to make sure about the existence of free random initial states in our self-
synchronized stream cipher that will guarantee the security of the system in a stronger
setting than the CPA model traditionally used for modes of operation. These basic ideas
will give rise to our proposed system introduced in Section 3. Also, we will discuss some
more control-theoretic aspects of our designs in Section 5.
However, to begin, after covering the necessary background in the rest of this section we
will concentrate on the details of the proposed security model (i.e. the LORBACPA+ setup)
in Section 2. Also, in this section we will elaborate on mentioning the basic ideas and prob-
lems using the classical CBC and CFB modes of operation and will mention two premature
modified versions of these modes that will both illustrate the basic design principles on the
one hand, and shows that the basic CBC and CFB modes are not flexible enough to lead to
a fully secure system in our security model. This in conjunction with the control theoretic
approach of G. Mille´rioux et.al. shows the importance of handling the initial vectors to gain
maximal security and operational efficiency in the design of stream ciphers. The main setup
of our proposed self-synchronized stream cipher will be introduced in Section 3 where we
also present the full security proof in our security model in Section 4.
As for the notations, the symbol F
q
= GF (q) for q a prime power, stands for the finite
field on q elements, R is the field of real numbers, and [n] stand for the set {1, 2..., n},
respectively. Also, if b ∈ {0, 1} then b¯ ∈ {0, 1} is the other complement bit, i.e, b¯ def= b − 1
modulo 2.
A vector of n elements in Fn
q
is denoted by s = (s1, s2, · · · , sn)T . If the elements of a
vector s are functions of a variable t, then we write s(t) to refer to the vector s at time t.
The set of n× n matrices with entries in F
q
is denoted by Mn×n. The symbol I stands for
the identity matrix, and 0 stands for the zero matrix (when the dimension is clear from the
context). The symbol s
$← Fn
q
demonstrates the action of picking s uniformly at random
from the set Fn
q
.
1.2 Self-synchronized stream-ciphers
From a data-transmission point of view a self-synchronized stream cipher is a master-slave
communication system consisting of a transmitter and a receiver as
Σ
θ
:
{
z(t) = f
θ
(c(t− l), · · · , c(t− l′)),
c(t+ d) = enc
θ
(z(t),p(t)),
Σ′
θ
:
{
ẑ(t+ d) = f
θ
(c(t− l), · · · , c(t− l′)),
p̂(t+ d) = dec
θ
(ẑ(t+ d), c(t+ d)),
(1)
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where f
θ
is the function that generate the key-streams {z(t)} and ẑ. The ciphertext c(t+d)
is worked out through an encryption function enc
θ
and the decryption is performed through
a function dec
θ
depending on the ciphertext c(t + d), in which l′ ≥ l ≥ 1 and d ≥ 0 is
the system delay. Note that if dec
θ
= enc−1
θ
and for some finite time synchronization delay
t
s
> d, we have
∀ t ≥ t
s
, ẑ(t+ d) = z(t),
then
∀ t ≥ ts ≥ 1 p̂(t+ d) = decθ (ẑ(t+ d), c(t+ d)) = p(t).
In this setting, t
c
def
= |l′− l+1| shows the amount of memory one needs to save the necessary
ciphertexts from the past. Hence, the self-synchronizing stream cipher must be initialized by
loading t
c
dummy ciphertext symbols at the beginning as part of the initial-condition vector
ICV. Note that to ensure correct deciphering of the plaintext, this data must be shared
between the transmitter and the receiver but does not necessarily need to be kept secret.
Let us emphasize that in Equation 1 and in all other equations that describe stream
ciphers in the sequel, t ∈ Z denotes the time, c(t) stands for the cipher stream (in blocks)
that is transmitted on the communication channel between the transmitter Σ
θ
and the
receiver Σ′
θ
. Similarly, p(t) stands for the plaintext stream (in blocks) and p̂(t) stands for
the stream (in blocks) that is extracted by the receiver. Hence, in this setting, for instance,
equations of Σ
θ
imply that c(t+ d) is generated at time t using the data z(t) and p(t), but
is transmitted on the channel d clocks later, at time t+d. On the other hand, the equations
of Σ′
θ
show that p̂(t+d) is computed at time t+d using ẑ(t+d) and c(t+d) that is received
through the communication channel with a delay d. These facts imply that, generically, in a
self-synchronized setting, and when both systems are synchronized, we have ẑ(t+ d) = z(t)
and p̂(t + d) = p(t) for t > 1. In what follows we always assume that the delayed signals
z(t) and p̂(t) are set to ⊥ when they are not defined.
A study of stream ciphers through a control theoretic approach has been pioneered by
G. Mille´rioux et.al. (see [17] and references therein) from which we know that the setup
introduced in Equations 1 is equivalent to the following setup under flatness condition (see
Lemma 1),
Γ
θ
:
{
s(t+ 1) = φ
θ
(s(t),p(t)),
c(t+ d) = ε
θ
(s(t),p(t)),
Γ′
θ
:
{
ŝ(t+ 1) = β
θ
(ŝ(t), c(t)),
p̂(t) = δ
θ
(ŝ(t), c(t)),
(2)
where φ
θ
and β
θ
are the functions that generate s(t) and ŝ(t) and also ε
θ
, δ
θ
are the encryp-
tion and the decryption functions. Such a system is said to be finite-time self-synchronized
if there exists some finite time ts such that for any initial condition
∀t ≥ t
s
, ŝ(t+ d) = s(t).
Note that after synchronization, i.e. for all t ≥ t
s
we have
p̂(t+ d) = p(t).
Although systems 1 and 2 are essentially equivalent under flatness condition (see Lemma 1),
but as our first crucial observation, we will see that there is a subtlety about the mapping
between initial conditions. In other words, the definition of initialization vector, IV, as it
is usually referred to in a cryptographic context is based on initializing System 1, while
for System 2 one may choose parts of the initial conditions randomly and still recover the
plaintex correctly using self-synchronization. This important technique of mapping self-
synchronization to a random initial condition is fundamental in our security analysis and
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shows the importance of the approach proposed by G. Mille´rioux et.al. for the design of
self-synchronized stream ciphers which is based on the design of flat systems of type 2.
Since we are going to analyze our proposed systems in a provable security model, we
elaborate on emphasizing on the computational details of our model as follows.
A self-synchronized dynamical cryptosystem scheme
Γ
d,ts
= (Gen, Init
Enc
, Init
Dec
,Enc
θ
,Dec
θ
)
is defined to be a set of efficient algorithms Gen, InitEnc , InitDec , Encθ and Decθ described
as follows.
- k: is the security parameter,
- Gen: is a probabilistic algorithm that on input 1k outputs the secret key κ.
- θ is a vector containing system parameters determined by κ and the public information.
- Init
Enc
: is a randomized algorithm that on input κ outputs an initial condition vector
ICV and the state initialization vector s(0).
- InitDec : is a randomized algorithm that on inputs κ and the vector IV (received through
the communication channel) outputs an initial condition vector ICV and the state
initialization vector ŝ(d).
- Enc
θ
: is a randomized algorithm that using initializations, a message block p(t) and a
state vector s(t), outputs a ciphertext block c(t) and an updated state vector s(t+ 1)
as follows,
Enc
θ
(t) :

(s(0), ICV)← InitEnc ,
If t = 0 then
s(1) = φ′
θ
(s(0), ICV),
c(d) = ε′
θ
(s(0), ICV),
Output : ⊥
Else
s(t+ 1) = φ
θ
(s(t),p(t)),
c(t+ d) = ε
θ
(s(t),p(t)),
Output : c(t),
(3)
where φ′
θ
and φ
θ
are the functions that generate s(1) and s(t+ 1) and also ε′
θ
and ε
θ
are encryption functions.
Dec
θ
: is a randomized algorithm that using initializations, a ciphertext c(t) and a
state vector ŝ(t), outputs a (recovered plaintext) block p̂(t) and an updated state
vector ŝ(t+ 1) as follows,
Dec
θ
(t) :

(ŝ(d), ICV)← Init
Dec
,
If t < d then
Output : Ack
If t = d then
ŝ(t+ 1) = β′
θ
(ŝ(t), c(d), ICV),
Output : Ack
Else
ŝ(t+ 1) = β
θ
(ŝ(t), c(t)),
p̂(t) = δ
θ
(ŝ(t), c(t)),
Output : p̂(t).
(4)
Where β′
θ
and β
θ
are the functions that generate ŝ(1) and ŝ(t + 1) and also δ
θ
is
decryption functions.
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Here again d is the system delay and t
s
> d is the synchronization delay, respectively.
We usually assume that δ
θ
= ε−1
θ
and that the first (t
s
−1) plaintexts are selected randomly
to ensure safe decryption of the plaintext. As a natural condition we always assume that ε
θ
resists collisions in the sense that for any pair of states (s, s′), the probability of not having
a collision like
ε
θ
(s,p) = ε
θ
(s′,p′)
for some p 6= p′ is greater than a noticeable function of the security parameter.
Also, note that the initial condition vector is generated using the secret key κ, however
the whole vector ICV is not necessarily transmitted to the receiver on the transmission
channel along with the ciphertext. For this, in what follows, IV always stands for part of
ICV that is transmitted (plainly) along with the ciphertext to the receiver. Note that in
this setting the rest of ICV is either determined by the secret key κ or is chosen at random
(of course the IV itself can also depend on the κ or be chosen at random but the difference
falls in the fact that IV is transmitted through the channel to the receiver).
The parametric function φ
θ
is called the update of the encryption process Enc, and the
parametric function β
θ
is called the update of the decryption process Dec.
The following lemma essentially reflects the main contribution of G. Mille´rioux et.al.
(see [14] and references therein) expressed in our setting.
Lemma 1. Consider the communication system Γ
d,ts
. Assuming that for all t ≥ t
s
we have
ŝ(t+ d) = s(t), then,
i) If δ
θ
= ε−1
θ
then for all t ≥ t
s
we have p̂(t+ d) = p(t).
ii) If Enc
θ
is flat, i.e. if there exist constants l, l′ and functions F
θ
and G
θ
such that
Γ
d,ts
:
{
s(t) = F
θ
(c(t− l), · · · , c(t− l′)),
p(t) = G
θ
(c(t− l), · · · , c(t− l′)), (5)
then Γ
d,ts
is equivalent to the following system which is in the form of System 1 (note
that the converse is trivial),
Σ
θ
(t) :

Initialize (c(ts − l), · · · , c(ts − l′)),
If t ≥ t
s
then
z(t) = H
θ
(c(t− l), · · · , c(t− l′)),
c(t+ d) = ε
θ
(z(t),p(t)).
(6)
Σ′
θ
(t) :

Receive (c(t
s
− l), · · · , c(t
s
− l′)),
If t ≥ t
s
then
ẑ(t+ d) = H
θ
(c(t− l), · · · , c(t− l′)),
p̂(t+ d) = δ
θ
(ẑ(t+ d), c(t+ d)).
(7)
Nowadays, self-synchronized stream ciphers (at least the classic ones) are much more
related to block ciphers than to synchronous stream ciphers. In this regard, it is well-known
that several modes of operation for block ciphers have been proposed among which a couple
of them (as CBC and CFB modes) are self-synchronized (e.g. see [18]).
Example 1. CBC and CFB modes
Given a block cipher with encryption Eκ and decryption Dκ, we may describe the CBC
and CFB modes as follows. Note that in both cases Init
Enc
and Init
Dec
are randomized
algorithms that on input 1k, output a random initial value IV (here t
s
= t
c
= 1 and d = 0).
5
The CBC mode:
Enc
θ
(t) :

Initialize IV,
s(0) = IV,
If t = 0 then
s(1) = s(0),
Output :⊥
Else
c(t) = Eκ(p(t)⊕ s(t)),
s(t+ 1) = c(t),
Output :c(t).
Dec
θ
(t) :

Receive IV,
ŝ(0) = IV,
If t = 0 then
ŝ(1) = ŝ(0),
Output :Ack
Else
ŝ(t+ 1) = c(t),
p̂(t) = Dκ(c(t))⊕ ŝ(t),
Output :p̂(t).
(8)
The CFB mode:
Enc
θ
(t) :

Initialize IV,
s(0) = IV,
If t = 0 then
s(1) = Eκ(IV),
Output :⊥
Else
s(t+ 1) = Eκ(c(t)),
c(t) = p(t)⊕ s(t),
Output :c(t).
Dec
θ
(t) :

Receive IV,
ŝ(0) = IV,
If t = 0 then
ŝ(1) = Eκ(IV),
Output :Ack
Else
ŝ(t+ 1) = Eκ(c(t)),
p̂(t) = ŝ(t)⊕ c(t),
Output :p̂(t).
(9)
I
2 Security models
In [12] Joux et.al. introduced a new attack to some modes of operation including the CBC
mode which was the initiating fundamental contribution leading to the blockwise models of
security for stream ciphers (also see [4] for other motivations). In [11] the authors proposed
a simple delay procedure to prevent the proposed attack as follows.
Example 2. DCBC: the delayed CBC mode [11]
- Here Init
Enc
and Init
Dec
are randomized algorithms that on input 1k, output a random
initial value IV (note that here we have t
s
= t
c
= d = 1).
- Enc
θ
(t) takes as inputs a plaintext block or the special symbol “stop” for any time.
Enc
θ
(t) :

Initialize IV,
s(0) = IV,
If t = 0 then
c(1) = s(0),
s(1) = s(0),
Output : ⊥
If p(t) = stop then
Output : c(t)
Else
c(t+ 1) = Eκ(s(t)⊕ p(t)),
s(t+ 1) = Eκ(s(t)⊕ p(t)),
Output : c(t).
Dec
θ
(t) :

Receive IV,
ŝ(1) = IV,
If t = 1 then
ŝ(2) = IV,
p̂(1) = Ack,
Output :p̂(1)
Else
ŝ(t+ 1) = c(t),
p̂(t) = Dκ(c(t))⊕ ŝ(t),
Output : p̂(t).
(10)
I
Although the proposed DCBC mode is secure in the blockwise security model (the details
will follow) let us consider the following setup showing that the delay procedure also has
some drawbacks.
Assume that the adversary has oracle access to the decryption update (not necessarily
to the whole decryption procedure) and uses the decryption update to do the encyption in
6
Adv Oracle
IV Enc
′
θ
(p0(1),p1(1)) Enc′
θ
(p0(2),p1(2)) Enc′
θ
(stop, stop) Enc′
θ
t = 1
cb(1)
t = 2
cb(2)
t = 3
cb(3)
t = 4
⊥
Figure 1: The interaction between the adversary and the oracle Enc′
θ
.
the following setting.
Enc
′
θ
(t) :

Initialize IV,
ŝ(1) = IV,
If t = 1 then
c(1) = IV,
ŝ(2) = IV,
Output : c(1).
If p(t− 1) = stop then
Output : ⊥
Else
c(t) = Eκ (̂s(t)⊕ p(t− 1)),
ŝ(t+ 1) = c(t),
Output : c(t).
(11)
Note that in a synchronized regime the response of Enc′
θ
is the same as that of Enc
θ
.
The following attack using the encryption oracle Enc′
θ
succeeds in a distinguishability test
as it is described below. This kind of attack is our basic motivation for our propose security
model in Section 2.1.
- The adversary uniformly chooses two messages
{
p0(t)
}
,
{
p1(t)
}
, each consisting of
two blocks, such that p0(2) 6= p1(2), and queries its oracle on this pair.
- The encryption of
{
pb(t)
}
as (cb(1), cb(2), cb(3), IV) is given to the adversary. (The
goal of the adversary will be to guess the value of b.)
- The adversary queries a pair (p˜0(1), p˜1(1)) for plaintexts (
{
p˜0(t)
}
,
{
p˜1(t)
}
) whose
first blocks, p˜0(1) and p˜1(1) are chosen uniformly at random.
- The adversary receives the encryption of p˜b(1) as (c˜b(1), c˜b(2)) and then sends the
second query as (p˜0(2), p˜1(2)) for which p˜0(2) = p˜1(2) = p0(2)⊕ cb(2)⊕ c˜b(2).
- The adversary receives c˜b(3).
- If c˜b(3) = cb(3) the adversary guesses b = 0, otherwise it sets b = 1.
Note that if b = 0 then,
c˜b(3) = Eκ(ŝ
b(3)⊕ p˜b(2)) = Eκ(c˜b(2)⊕ p0(2)⊕ cb(2)⊕ c˜b(2)) = cb(3),
while if b = 1 with a chance of at least 12 we have,
c˜b(3) = Eκ(ŝ
b(3)⊕ p˜b(2)) = Eκ(c˜b(2)⊕ p0(2)⊕ cb(2)⊕ c˜b(2)) 6= cb(3).
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It is instructive to note that a similar attack is not applicable using the Enc
θ
oracle.
Also, this example shows that although applying a delay procedure may prevent attacks
in the blockwise security model but at the same time it may still make the whole system
vulnerable to the attacks using the decryption update (which is quite feasible in practice).
2.1 The LORBACPA+ security model
Our main objective in this section is to formalize a security model that can be used for
both random and nonrandom (nonce) initialization scenarios within the blockwise model
using decryption update. It will become clear that this security model, hereafter called
LORBACPA+, is stronger than the blockwise CPA model, where our ultimate aim in the
next sections will be to propose a LORBACPA+ secure self-synchronized stream cipher.
To begin, we have to formalize the oracles we are going to use in our security model.
Definition 1. LORBA encryption oracles
A left-or-right blockwise adaptive encryption oracle E(−, b) is an oracle applying the
function Enc
θ
in the following way (depending on the specified parameters).
• Each communication with the oracle is either an initialization request of a new session
or a request for encryption.
• For each initialization request we have the following cases:
– If the oracle is a randomly initialized oracle, denoted by E($IV, b), then the oracle
starts a new session using a random initializing data and sends the number of the
session along with the (randomly fixed) IV to the main program.
– If the oracle is of chosen IV type, denoted by E(IV, b), then the initialization
request contains an IV chosen by the program (i.e. the adversary) and the oracle
uses this IV along with the key and possibly other randomly chosen initializing
parameters (if any) and returns the session number to the main program.
– The oracle uses Init
Enc
to determine s(0).
• Each encryption request is of the form (p0,p1, i) containing two plaintext-blocks p0
and p1 with same length and session number i. The oracle is capable of saving the
history of each session (in particular the state vectors s(t)), therefore, upon receiving
such a request the oracle returns the encryption of the block pb using the history of
the session i along with the IV by applying
Enc
θ
(t) :

Use history of (s(0), IV, ICV),
If t = 0 then
s(1) = φ′
θ
(s(0), ICV),
c(d) = ε′
θ
(s(0), ICV),
Output : c(0)
Else
s(t+ 1) = φ
θ
(s(t),pb(t)),
c(t+ d) = ε
θ
(s(t),pb(t)),
Output : c(t).
(12)
Note that the oracle is capable of answering different queries related to different sessions
intermittently.
J
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Definition 2. Synchronized LORBA encryption oracles
A left-or-right blockwise adaptive synchronized encryption oracle SE(−, b) is an oracle
applying the update of the decryption process in the following way (depending on the spec-
ified parameters).
• The function of the oracle is the same as that of a LORBA encryption oracle as far as
the initialization of the sessions are concerned but uses Init
Dec
to determine ŝ(d).
• Each encryption request is of the form (p0,p1, i) containing two plaintext-blocks p0
and p1 along with a session number i.
• The oracle is capable of saving the history of each session, therefore, upon receiving
such a request the oracle returns the encryption of the block pb using the history of
the session s along with the IV by applying the update of the decryption procedure as
Enc′
θ
(t) :

Use history of (ŝ(d), IV, ICV),
If t = d then
c(t) = ε′
θ
(ŝ(t), ICV),
ŝ(t+ 1) = β′
θ
(ŝ(t), ICV),
Output : c(d)
If pb(t− d) = stop then
Output : ⊥
Else
c(t) = ε
θ
(ŝ(t),pb(t− d)),
ŝ(t+ 1) = β
θ
(ŝ(t), c(t)),
Output : c(t).
(13)
Note that the oracle is capable of answering different queries related to different sessions
intermittently.
J
Now we focus on the adversary model.
Definition 3. The LORBACPA+ model
We refer to our security model as LORBACPA(−,−) where in what follows we describe
the model and its dependence on the two undetermined parameters.
• A LORBACPA(−,−) adversaryA is a nonuniform probabilistic polynomial time oracle
Turing machine.
• The adversary uses either a LORBA encryption oracle or a synchronized LORBA
encryption oracle or both of them. The second parameter denotes the oracle type as
in LORBACPA(−, E) or LORBACPA(−, SE) which are referred to as simple oracle
models or LORBACPA(−, (E&SE)) which is referred to as a mixed oracle model.
• The first parameter denotes whether the adversary can choose the initial vector IV
or not. In particular, for an LORBACPA(IV,−) oracle the initial vector IV can be
chosen by the adversary for each encryption session and be sent to the oracle, while
for a LORBACPA($IV,−) oracle the initial vector of each session is chosen at random
by the oracle and will be sent to the adversary in response to each one of the queries.
It is instructive to recall that IV is the part of the initialization information that
is transmitted on the communication channel. In what follows the security model
LORBACPA(IV, (E&SE)) is referred to as LORBACPA+.
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• The adversary may query its oracle(s) about the encryption of different blocks of
different messages during its computation. For each one of these messages a session
must be initialized by the adversary and after that queries about consecutive blocks
may be sent to the oracle. The oracle has the capability to save the history of each
session so that the adversary may submit queries concerning the encryption of different
blocks of different messages (sessions) intermittently1.
The adversary simulates the following experiment eval(A).
• A key κ is generated by Gen(1k).
• A bit b is chosen uniformly at random (unknown to the adversary) and the adversary
is given access to its LORBA oracle(s) (E(−, b) and/or SE(−, b)) of type b.
• The adversary may send queries to its oracle concurrently.
• The adversary outputs a bit b′ as the result.
• The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 (it succeeds) if b = b′ and 0 otherwise.
If it returns 1, we say that A succeeds and otherwise it fails.
We define the advantage of an adversaryA attacking a system S in the LORBACPA(−,−)
model as
Adv
LORBACPA(−,−)
A,S (k) = 2
∣∣Pr(eval(A) = 1)− 12 ∣∣
= |[Pr(eval(A) = 1|b = 1)− Pr(eval(A) = 1|b = 0)]|
= |[Pr
1
(eval(A) = 1)− Pr
0
(eval(A) = 1)]| .
Also, the insecurity of such a system S in the LORBACPA(−,−) model is defined as
Insec
LORBACPA(−,−)
S (k) = maxA
Adv
LORBACPA(−,−)
A,S .
Clearly, such a system S is said to be secure in the corresponding LORBACPA model if
Insec
LORBACPA(−,−)
S (k) is negligible compared to k e.t.
Insec
LORBACPA(−,−)
S (k) < negl(k).
Where negl(k) is negligible function compared to k.
J
On the other hand, for sufficiently large k, we have,
Insec
LORBACPA($IV,E)
S (k) ≤ InsecLORBACPA(IV,E)S (k)
and
Insec
LORBACPA($IV,SE)
S (k) ≤ InsecLORBACPA(IV,SE)S (k),
indicating that LORBACPA+ is the strongest security model in this setting.
Next, we are going to consider a fundamental type of attack based on detecting colli-
sions, which will be our basic guideline in Section 3 for the security analysis. But, before
introducing the attack let us first fix some notations and concepts to be used in what follows.
Note that an adversary A in a LORBACPA(−,−) security model, is essentially a ran-
domized algorithm having interactions with LORBA encryption oracles E or SE. In this
setting we use the following notations:
1Sometimes this is referred to as concurrent blockwise encryption ability.
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• t: is the global counter for the clock of the algorithm referring to the global real time.
• o: refers to an oracle of type E or SE. Note that the algorithm may initiate different
sessions and ask queries intermittently and without any loss in generality we may
assume that there are at most two oracles, one of type E and the other of type
SE, where they are capable of initiating and answering queries for different sessions
(appropriately keeping the history of each session separately).
• i: refers to the session number.
• q(o, i, τ, ν): refers to the query asked from oracle o, in the ith session, while this query
is the τth query of the ith session, and it is the νth query asked by the algorithm
(counting all queries from the beginning). In this setting we may write (p0,p1, i) =
q(o, i, τ, ν) to indicate that (p0,p1, i) is the corresponding query in the ith session.
Now, let us define a collision attack as follows.
Definition 4. Within a LORBACPA(−,−) security model for a self-synchronized system S
with delay d and synchronization time t
s
consider an adversary interacting with its oracle(s)
o and o′ each of which can be of type E or SE, and assume that the adversary has initiated a
number of sessions of queries. In this setting, a collision for sessions i and i′ (not necessarily
distinct) is the event Coll((o, i, τ), (o′, i′, τ ′), b) for which the adversary have the following
collision for the ciphertexts,
ε
θ
(s(τ + dδo),p
b
i,o(τ)) = εθ (s
′(τ ′), p˜bi′,o′(τ
′))
and
ε
θ
(s(τ + dδo),p
b¯
i,o(τ)) 6= εθ (s′(τ ′), p˜b¯i′,o′(τ ′))
where δ
SE
= 1, δ
E
= 0 and we have
(p0i,o,p
1
i,o, i) = q(o, i, τ, ν) and (p˜
0
i′,o′ , p˜
1
i′,o′ , i) = q(o
′, i′, τ ′, ν′).
A LORBACPA(−,−) collision attack is a LORBACPA(−,−) adversary for which the
probability of detecting a collision is non-negligible. J
Clearly, the main objective of a collision attack is to provide an algorithm (whose output
depends on the queries) that can maximize the probability of a collision. For this, a straight
forward approach is to provide a sequence of queries in different sessions such that it leads
to a collision. To see this, note that the attack provided in Section 2 for the DCBC mode is
essentially a collision attack using only one oracle of type SE.
We should emphasize that the straight forward scenario mentioned above is not the only
possible setup for a collision attack where one may think of many different approaches to
detect collisions. To see one more scenario, consider an adversary who uses one oracle of
type E and one other oracle of type SE, while the adversary tries to detect ts consecutive
ciphertexts such that
∀ 0 ≤ j ≤ t
s
− 1 cbE((τ − ts) + j) = cbSE((τ ′ + d− ts) + j),
in which the flag b refers to the oracle action type (i.e. left or right). Note that as a
consequence of synchronization we have s(τ) = ŝ(τ ′ + d).
Then choosing p0i,E(τ) = p
0
i′,SE(τ
′) for b = 0 we have,
cbE(τ + d)− cbSE(τ ′ + d) = εθ (s(τ),p0i,E(τ))− εθ (̂s(τ ′ + d),p0i′,SE(τ ′)) = 0. (14)
On the other hand, choosing a random p1i,E(τ) = p! 6= 0 for b = 1 and setting p1i′,SE(τ ′) = 0
we have,
cbE(τ + d)− cbSE(τ ′ + d) = εθ (s(τ),p1i,E(τ))− εθ (̂s(τ ′ + d),p1i′,SE(τ ′))
= ε
θ
(s(τ),p
!
)− ε
θ
(s(τ), 0).
(15)
Then effectiveness of the algorithm follows from the fact that ε
θ
is collision resistant.
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Corollary 1. A self-synchronized stream cipher S for which there exists τ
0
and a func-
tion f such that s(τ
0
) = f(IV) (resp. ŝ(τ
0
) = f(IV)), is not LORBACPA(IV, E) (resp.
LORBACPA(IV, SE)) secure.
Proof. For a collision attack, the adversary initializes two sessions i and i′ with the same
initial values IV, respectively. Then it chooses p0i,o(τ0) = p
1
i,o(τ0) = p˜
0
i′,o(τ0) = p! 6= 0
uniformly at random and set p˜1i′,o(τ0) = 0. Since s(τ0) = s
′(τ0) = f(IV) (resp. ŝ(τ0) =
ŝ′(τ
0
) = f(IV)), this gives rise to a collision for the queries
(p
!
,p
!
, i) = q(o, i, τ0 , ν) and (p! , 0, i
′) = q(o, i′, τ0 , ν
′).

An important consequence of this corollary is the fact that the state vectors of a secure
LORBACPA(IV,−) self-synchronized stream cipher must possess a pseudorandom nature
and should not be a deterministic function of the initial vector IV.
Before we proceed any further, let us consider some well-known self-synchronized block-
cipher modes and their security in our proposed models.
In [12] A. Joux et.al. have shown that the CBC encryption mode cannot be IND secure
in the blockwise adversarial model, which implies that, in our language, the CBC mode is
not LORBACPA($IV, E) secure. Subsequently, P. Fouque et.al. [11] using an output delay
procedure, introduced the delayed CBC mode, DCBC (see Example 2), and proved that it
is secure in the blockwise model (assuming the security of the underlying block cipher). This
implies that the DCBC mode is LORBACPA($IV, E) secure under the same assumptions
(note that our LORBACPA($IV, E) security is equivalent to the LORC− BCPA security in
[11]). On the other hand, the DCBC mode is not LORBACPA(IV,−) secure by Corollary 1.
Clearly, the DCBC mode is also not secure in the LORBACPA($IV, SE) setting by the
collision attack presented at the beginning of this section.
For the CFB mode, by the results of [11], we know that the scheme is provably secure
in the blockwise model, assuming the security of the underlying block cipher (or function)
which is equivalent to our LORBACPA($IV, E) security. It is instructive to note that
the update and output functions of an SE($IV, b) oracle for the CFB mode is identical
to those of the oracle E($IV, b). This, in particular, proves that the CFB mode is also
LORBACPA($IV, SE) secure. On the other hand, the CFB mode is not LORBACPA(IV,−)
secure by Corollary 1.
2.2 A modification
This section is going to serve as an appetizer before we focus on our final proposal in the next
section. Based on our results of the previous section we understand that we have to choose
a pseudorandom state update procedure in order to prevent insecurity in LORBACPA+
model. Our major objective in this section is to analyze the performance of a modification
on well-known encryption modes based on choosing this approach and adding iterations of a
nilpotent linear function for finite-time self-synchronization to the scheme. We will see that
although this modification will not give rise to better encryption modes but the analysis will
pave the way to introduce our proposed scheme in the next section in which we will have to
prevent linearity and we also force the iteration function to depend on the secret key.
2.2.1 A modified DCBC mode
Let us introduce the modified DCBC mode as follows.
Definition 5. The MDCBC mode.
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- f : is a known linear function with a natural number n
0
> 1 such that
∀ x fn0 (x) def= f(f(...(f(x)))) = 0.
-
Enc
θ
(t) :

Initialize IV,
s(0)
$← Fn
2
,
If t = 0 then
c(1) = IV,
s(1) = IV ⊕ f(s(0)),
Output : ⊥
Else
c(t+ 1) = Eκ(s(t)⊕ p(t)),
s(t+ 1) = Eκ(s(t)⊕ p(t))⊕ f(s(t)),
Output : c(t).
Dec
θ
(t) :

Receive IV,
ŝ(1)
$← Fn
2
,
If t = 1 then
ŝ(2) = IV ⊕ f (̂s(1)),
p̂(t) = Ack,
Output : p̂(t)
Else
ŝ(t+ 1) = c(t)⊕ f (̂s(t)),
p̂(t) = Dκ(c(t))⊕ ŝ(t),
Output : p̂(t).
(16)
Note that for the MDCBC mode we have tc = 1 and d = 1. In what follows we show that
also ts = n0 .
J
Lemma 2. The MDCBC mode is finite-time self-synchronized with ts = n0 , i.e.
∀t ≥ t
s
= n
0
, ŝ(t+ 1) = s(t).
Proof.
e(t+ 1)
def
= ŝ(t+ 2)− s(t+ 1)
= c(t+ 1)⊕ f(ŝ(t+ 1))− (Eκ(s(t)⊕ p(t))⊕ f(s(t)))
= f(ŝ(t+ 1))− f(s(t)) = f(ŝ(t+ 1)− s(t)) = f(e(t)).
(17)
Hence, according to the definition of the MDCBC system, the error is equal to zero for
t ≥ ts = n0 . 
The following lemma shows that our modification is not effective in the presence of an
SE oracle.
Lemma 3. The MDCBC mode is not LORBACPA($IV, SE) secure.
Proof. Recall that an SE($IV, b) oracle operates as follows,
Enc′
θ
(t) :

Initialize IV,
ŝ(1)
$← Fn
2
,
If t = 1 then
ŝ(2) = f(ŝ(1))⊕ IV,
c(1) = IV,
Output : c(1)
If p(t− 1) = stop then
Output : ⊥
Else
c(t) = Eκ(ŝ(t)⊕ p(t− 1)),
ŝ(t+ 1) = c(t)⊕ f(ŝ(t)),
Output : c(t).
(18)
We introduce a collision attack whose success probability is equal to one. For this,
the adversary initializes two sessions i and i′ with two random initial values IV and ˜IV,
respectively. Then it chooses at random a sequence {(p0i,SE(τ),p1i,SE(τ))}, 0 < τ < ts
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with p0i,SE(ts) = p
1
i,SE(ts) = p! 6= 0 uniformly at random and receives {cb(1), · · · , cb(ts)}.
Then it chooses two random sequences {(p˜0i′,SE(τ), p˜1i′,SE(τ))}, 0 < τ < ts and receives
{c˜b(1), · · · , c˜b(ts)}. Then it sets p˜1i′,SE(ts) = 0 and p˜0i,SE(ts) = p∗ , with
p∗ = p! ⊕ cb(ts)⊕ · · · ⊕ f ts−1(IV)⊕ c˜b(ts)⊕ · · · ⊕ f ts−1( ˜IV)
for session i′. Since we have
ŝ(ts + 1) = c
b(ts)⊕ f(cb(ts − 1))⊕ · · · ⊕ f (ts−1)(IV)
and
ŝ′(ts + 1) = c˜
b(ts)⊕ f(c˜b(ts − 1))⊕ · · · ⊕ f (ts−1)( ˜IV),
this gives rise to a collision for the queries
(p
!
,p
!
, i) = q(SE, i, t
s
+ 1, ν) and (p∗ , 0, i
′) = q(SE, i′, t
s
+ 1, ν′).

2.2.2 A modified CFB mode
Now let us concentrate on a modified version of the CFB mode as follows,
Definition 6. The MCFB mode.
- f : is a known linear function such that there exists a natural number n0 > 1 such that
∀ x fn0 (x) def= f(f(...(f(x)))) = 0.
-
Enc
θ
(t) :

Initialize IV,
s(0)
$← Fn
2
,
If t = 0 then
s(1) = Eκ(IV)⊕ f(s(0)),
Output : ⊥
Else
s(t+ 1) = Eκ(c(t))⊕ f(s(t)),
c(t) = p(t)⊕ s(t),
Output : c(t).
Dec
θ
(t) :

Receive IV,
ŝ(0)
$← Fn
2
,
If t = 0 then
ŝ(1) = Eκ(IV)⊕ f (̂s(0)),
Output : Ack
Else
ŝ(t+ 1) = Eκ(c(t))⊕ f (̂s(t)),
p̂(t) = ŝ(t)⊕ c(t),
Output : p̂(t).
(19)
Note that for the MCFB mode we have tc = 1 and d = 0. In what follows we show that also
ts = n0 . J
Lemma 4. The MCFB mode is finite-time self-synchronized with ts = n0 , i.e.
∀t ≥ t
s
, ŝ(t) = s(t).
Proof.
e(t+ 1)
def
= ŝ(t+ 1)− s(t+ 1)
= Eκ(c(t)) + f(ŝ(t))− Eκ(c(t))− f(s(t))
= f(ŝ(t))− f(s(t)) = f(ŝ(t)− s(t)) = f(e(t)).
(20)
Hence, according to the definition of the MCFB system, the error is equal to zero for
t ≥ ts = n0 . 
Lemma 5. The MCFB mode is not LORBACPA(IV, E) secure.
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Proof. The MCFB mode is CFB mode with a linear transformation MCFB mode is a
simple reduction of MCFB mode. For any t > 0, with Linear transformation f
ts−1
κ (.) over
encryption update and output functions MCFB mode, we have
Enc”
θ
(t) :

Initialize IV,
s(0)
$← Fn
2
,
If t = 0 then
s(1) = Eκ(IV)⊕ f(s(0)),
Output : ⊥
Else
s(t+ 1) = Eκ(c(t))⊕ f(s(t)),
c′(t) = f ts−1(c(t)) = f ts−1(p(t))⊕ f ts−1(s(t)),
Output : c(t).
(21)
The following collision attack finds a collision with probability 1. For this, the adversary
initializes two sessions i and i′ with the same initial values IV. Then it chooses p0i,E(1) =
p1i,E(1) = p! 6= 0 uniformly at random. On the other hand, it sets p˜0i′,E(1) = p! , p˜1i′,E(1) = 0.
Since c′(t) = f ts−1(s(t) ⊕ p(t)), s(1) = Eκ(IV) ⊕ f(s(0)) and s˜(1) = Eκ(IV) ⊕ f(s˜(0)),
this gives rise to a collision for the queries
(p
!
,p
!
, i) = q(E, i, 1, ν) and (p
!
, 0, i′) = q(E, i′, 1, ν′).

This shows that MCFB mode is not LORBACPA(IV,−) secure. The following table
summarizes our results so far.
Table 1: Security results for CBC, CFB, DCBC, and S4σ(P) cryptosystems.
System/LORBACPA ($IV, E) (IV, E) ($IV, SE) (IV, SE) ($IV, (E&SE)) + Ref.
CBC × × × × × × [11]
DCBC
√ × × × × × [11], Example 2, Cor. 1
CFB
√ × √ × √ × [11], Cor. 1
S4σ
√ √ √ √ √ √
Sec. 4
3 The S4σ(P) cryptosystem
In this section we define our proposed2 cryptosystem S4σ(Gen,Encκ,Decκ,P) which is based
on basic ideas comming from the design of cryptographic modes of operations and the
contributions of G. Mille´rioux et.al. [17] in design and analysis of switching cryptosystems.
3.1 System description
Here we go through the details of our system’s description.
• Definition of parameters
– The integer n is system’s dimension which also determines the length of each
block of plaintext or ciphertext.
2The acronym stands for Switching Self-Synchronized Stream-cipher
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– The integer q stands for the size of the finite field F
q
.
– The security parameter is k = n log q.
– The key generator Gen: is a probabilistic algorithm that on input 1k outputs the
secret key κ.
– The family P: is a family of pseudorandom permutations on the elements of
GF (q) as pi
κ
: F
q
→F
q
indexed by the (secret) key string κ.
In this setting the one-to-one function ℘
κ
: Fn
q
→Fn
q
(resp. ℘(−1)
κ
: Fn
q
→Fn
q
) is
defined by the action of the (secret) random permutation piκ (resp. pi
(−1)
κ
) on
each entry of an n-vector in Fn
q
.
– The switching function σ(t) : N → [`] (see [17]): The switching function must
depend on the output of the system, while the motivation of such a dependence
lies in that the switching rule must also be self-synchronizing. Thus, it must
depend on shared variables and so on the output or a finite sequence of delayed
outputs.
– Matrices: The matrix W and for j ∈ [`], the matrices Lj ,Fj are secret invertible
matrices in Mn×n. The set {Qj | j ∈ [`]} is a public nilpotent semigroup of
matrices of index n
0
(see e.g. [17]).
On the other hand, for any j ∈ [`], the matrices Ej ,Bj inMn×n are public invert-
ible matrices, where, for any j ∈ [`], we define Aj def= EjF−1j Bj , Rj def= EjF−1j
and Dj
def
= EjF
−1
j Lj −Qj ,.
– The matrix M is an upper triangular public matrix with zeros on the diagonal
in Mm0×m0 .
– At any time t ∈ N, p(t) ∈ F
q
and c(t) ∈ F
q
are the plaintext and the ciphertext
at time t.
p(t) = (p((t− 1)n+ 1), p((t− 1)n+ 2), · · · , p(tn))T
and
c(t) = (c((t− 1)n+ 1), c((t− 1)n+ 2), · · · , c(tn))T
are the t ≥ 1’th blocks of plaintext and ciphertext, respectively. We assume that
each block of data is of length n whose symbols are numbered from 1 to n, and
that the end of encryption is indicated by sending a predefined block p(t) = stop.
Also, we assume that if the decryption algorithm does not have to output a block,
it sends, as an acknowledgment, a predefined block Ack.
• Encryption procedure (Enc
κ
)
– The transmitter chooses a vector s(0) = (s(0)1 · · · , s(0)n)T at random in Fnq .
– The transmitter chooses two random vectors m(0), c(0) ∈ Fn
q
and forms the initial-
value vector IV
def
= (m(0), c(0)) with
c(0) = (c(1− n), · · · , c(0))T ,
m(0) = (m(0)1 · · · ,m(0)m
0
)T
and transmits this vector over the public channel.
– The general description of the encryption procedure is as follows (see Figures 2
and 3).
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Gen(1k)→ κ Gen(1k)→ κ
(s(0), IV)
$← Fn
q
,
Initial :{piκ , σ, {Lj}`j=0, {Fj}`j=0}
Public : {Bj}`j=0, {Ej}`j=0,M,
{Qj}`
j=0
.
Compute : {Aj}`j=0, {Dj}`j=0.
Encκ :
 Input :{p(t)}Kernel Enc(p(t))Output :({c(t)}, IV)
(̂s(1), IV)
$← Fn
q
,
Initial :{piκ , σ, {Lj}`j=0, {Fj}`j=0}
Public : {Bj}`j=0, {Ej}`j=0,M,
{Qj}`
j=0
.
Compute : {Aj}`j=0, {Dj}`j=0.
Decκ :
 Input :({c(t)}, IV)KernelDec(c(t))Output :{p̂(t)}
{p(t)} {p̂(t)}{c(t)}, IV
Figure 2: The S4σ(P) cryptosystem.
Encκ :

Input : {p(t), t ≥ 1}
Initial : piκ , σ(t), s(0), IV, {Bj}, {Ej}, {Fj}, {Lj},W,M
Kernel Enc(p(t)), t ≥ 1
Output : ({c(t), t ≥ 1}, IV).
Kernel Enc(p(t)) :

IV = (m(0), c(0)), s(0)
$← Fn
q
,
If t = 0 then s(1) = s(0),m(1) = m(0),c(1) = c(0),
Output :⊥.
If t = 1 then{
update Enc,
c(2) = εκ (z(1),p(1)),
Output :c(1)
If p(t) = stop then
Output :c(t)
Else{
update Enc,
c(t+ 1) = εκ (z(t),p(t)),
Output :c(t).
where the details of the functions in update procedure are as follows,
update Enc :

Initial : j = σ(t),
s(t+ 1) = Wm(t) +Djs(t) +Aj℘κ (s(t)) + Ej℘κ (p(t)),
m(t+ 1) = Mm(t) + c(t),
z(t) = Ljs(t) +Bj℘κ (s(t)),
(22)
Output Enc : c(t+ 1) = z(t) + Fj℘κ (p(t)). (23)
• Decryption procedure (Decθ)
The input to the receiver is the ciphertext stream and the initial-vector ({c(t)}, IV).
In S4σ(P) we have tc = 1 as the cipher delay and the receiver operates as an unknown
input observer as follows.
– The receiver selects a vector ŝ(1) = (ŝ(1)1 · · · , ŝ(1)n)T at random in Fnq .
– The general setup of the receiver procedure is as follows,
Decκ :

Input : ({c(t) t ≥ 1}, IV)
Initial : piκ , σ(t), ŝ(1), IV, {Bj}, {Ej}, {Fj}, {Lj},W,M
KernelDec(c(t)), t ≥ 1
Output : {p̂(t) t ≥ 2}.
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update Enc ⊥
p(1) update Enc c(1) = c(0)
p(2) update Enc c(2) = ε
κ
(.,p(1))
· · ·
p(t) = stop update Enc c(t) = εκ(.,p(t− 1))
(s(1),m(1))
(s(2),m(2))
(s(3),m(3))
(s(t),m(t))
Figure 3: The general scheme of S4σ(P) cryptosystem steps.
KernelDec(c(t)) :

IV = (m(0), c(0)), ŝ(1)
$← Fn
q
,
if t = 0 then
Output : Ack
if t = 1 then{
ŝ(2) = ŝ(1),
m̂(2) = m(0),
Output : Ack
Else{
update Dec,
p̂(t) = δκ (ẑ(t), c(t), {F−1j }),
Output : p̂(t).
where the details of the functions in update procedure are as follows,
update Dec :

Initial : j = σ(t− 1),
ẑ(t) = Lj ŝ(t) +Bj℘κ (̂s(t)),
ŝ(t+ 1) = Wm̂(t) +Dj ŝ(t) +Aj℘κ (̂s(t)) +Rj(c(t)− ẑ(t)),
m̂(t+ 1) = Mm̂(t) + c(t− 1),
(24)
Output Dec : p̂(t) = ℘
(−1)
κ
(F
−1
j (c(t)− ẑ(t))). (25)
3.2 Verification of system properties
The following lemma describes the main properties of S4σ(P).
Lemma 6. The S4σ(P) cryptosystem is finite-time self-synchronized with ts = n0 , delay 1
and dummy ciphertext symbols t
c
≤ t
s
+m
0
. Also, Encκ is a flat dynamical systems.
Proof. Clearly the lemma follows from the following four claims.
i) The algorithm Decκ operates as an unknown input observer for Encκ in a self-synchronized
setup, i.e.
∀t ≥ t
s
, ŝ(t+ 1) = s(t).
ii) For any t ≥ t
s
we have p̂(t+ 1) = p(t) and system’s delay is d = 1.
iii) For any t ≥ t
s
, we have
s(t+ 1) = (
∏t
i=1Qσ(i))s(1)
+
∑h=t
h=1
[
(
∏t
i=h+1Qσ(i))Wm(h) + (
∏t
i=h+1Qσ(i))Eσ(h)F
−1
σ(h)
(c(h))
]
.
(26)
18
iv) For all t ≥ ts , the vector s(t+ 1) and ŝ(t+ 2) depends on a finite number of previous
ciphertexts, i.e.
ŝ(t+ 2) = s(t+ 1) =
{
Fκ (c(t− ts −m0 ), · · · , c(t)) t > m0
Fκ (m(0)t−ts · · · ,m(0)m0 , c(1), · · · , c(t)) t ≤ m0 .
(27)
Now, we prove each on of these claims as follows.
For Part (i) note that,
e(t+ 1) = ŝ((t+ 1) + 1)− s(t+ 1)
= Wm̂(t+ 1) +Dj ŝ(t+ 1) +Aj℘κ (̂s(t+ 1)) +Rj(c(t+ 1)− ẑ(t+ 1))−(Wm(t) +Djs(t) +Aj℘κ (s(t)) + Ej℘κ (p(t)))
= Dje(t) +Aj℘κ (̂s(t+ 1))
+Rj(Ljs(t) +Bj℘κ (s(t)) + Fj℘κ (p(t))− Lj ŝ(t+ 1)−Bj℘κ (̂s(t+ 1)))−Aj℘κ (s(t))− Ej℘κ (p(t))
= (Dj −RjLj)e(t) = Qje(t).
(28)
Hence, since {Qj | j ∈ [`]} is a nilpotent semigroup of matrices of index n0 ,
∀t ≥ ts = n0 , ŝ(t+ 1) = s(t).
Part (ii) is a direct consequence of Part (i), i.e.,
p̂(t+ 1) = ℘(−1)
κ
(F−1j (c(t+ 1)− ẑ(t+ 1)))
= F−1j ℘
−1
κ
(c(t+ 1)−Bj℘κ (̂s(t+ 1))− Lj ŝ(t+ 1))
= F−1j ℘
−1
κ
(Bj℘κ (s(t)) + Ljs(t) + Fj℘κ (p(t))−Bj℘κ (̂s(t+ 1))− Lj ŝ(t+ 1))
= ℘(−1)
κ
(F−1j (Fj℘κ (p(t)))) = p(t).
(29)
On the other hand, since c(t+ 1) = εκ(z(t),p(t)) we deduce that the delay is d = 1.
For Part (iii) we use induction on time t ≥ 2.
• For t = 2:
Considering c(t+ 1) = z(t) + Fj℘κ(p(t)), we have,
s(2) = Wm(1) +Dσ(1)s(1) +Aσ(1)℘κ (s(1)) + Eσ(1)℘κ (p(1))
Wm(1) +Dσ(1)s(1) +Aσ(1)℘κ (s(1)) + Eσ(1)F
−1
σ(1)
(c(2)−Bσ(1)℘κ (s(1))− Lσ(1)s(1)) =
(Dσ(1) − Eσ(1)F−1σ(1)Lσ(1))s(1) +Wm(1) + Eσ(1)F−1σ(1)c(2).
(30)
• The induction step for time t:
Assuming (26); that is,
s(t) = (
∏t−1
i=1 Qσ(i))s(1)+∑h=t−1
h=1
[
(
∏t−1
i=h+1Qσ(i))Wm(h) + (
∏t−1
i=h+1Qσ(i))Eσ(h)F
−1
σ(h)
c(h+ 1)
]
.
(31)
then using equations (22) and (14) for s(t+ 1) we may conclude that,
s(t+ 1) = Wm(t) +Aσ(t)℘κ (s(t)) + Eσ(t)℘κ (p(t)) +Dσ(t)s(t)
= Wm(t) +Aσ(t)℘κ (s(t)) + Eσ(t)℘κ (p(t)) +Dσ(t)((
∏t−1
i=1 Qσ(i))s(1)
+
∑h=t−1
h=1
[
(
∏t−1
i=h+1Qσ(i))Wm(h) + (
∏t−1
i=h+1Qσ(i))Eσ(h)F
−1
σ(h)
c(h+ 1)
]
)
= (
∏t
i=1Qσ(i))s(1)+∑h=t
h=1
[
(
∏t
i=h+1Qσ(i))Wm(h) + (
∏t
i=h+1Qσ(i))Eσ(h)F
−1
σ(h)
c(h+ 1)
]
.
(32)
Thus, (26) holds for time (t+ 1), and the proof of the induction step is complete.
For Part (iv) note that {Qj | j ∈ [`]} is a nilpotent semigroup of matrices of index ts = n0 ,
and consequently, for t ≥ t
s
we have (
∏t
i=1 Qσ(i))s(1) = 0. Hence, using (32), for any t ≥ ts
we have
s(t+ 1) =
∑h=t
h=t−ts
[
(
∏t
i=h+1Qσ(i))Wm(h) + (
∏t
i=h+1Qσ(i))Eσ(h)F
−1
σ(h)
c(h)
]
. (33)
Also, since for h > n, and m(h) is a linear function of c(h− 1−m
0
), · · · , c(h− 1) and for
h ≤ m
0
, we know that m(h) is a linear function of c(1), · · · , c(h− 1) and m(0)h · · · ,m(0)m0
we may conclude that for all t ≥ t
s
and ,
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s(t+ 1) =
{
F
κ
(c(t− t
s
−m
0
), · · · , c(t)) t > m
0
Fκ(m(0)t−ts · · · ,m(0)m0 , c(1), · · · , c(t)) t ≤ m0 .
(34)
The amount of memory needed at most to save the necessary ciphertexts from the past
is
t− (t− t
s
−m
0
) = t
s
+m
0
,
and consequently, Encκ is flat.
Now, we prove that for t ≥ t
s
ŝ(t+ 2) =
{
F
κ
(c(t− t
s
−m
0
), · · · , c(t)) t > m
0
,
Fκ(m(0)t−ts · · · ,m(0)m0 , c(1), · · · , c(t)) t ≤ m0 .
(35)
We use induction on time t ≥ 3.
• For t = 3:
We have,
ŝ(3) = Wm̂(2) +Dσ(1)ŝ(2) +Aσ(1)℘κ (̂s(2)) +Rσ(1)(c(2)− ẑ(2))
= (Dσ(1) − Eσ(1)F−1σ(1)Lσ(1) )̂s(2) +Wm̂(2) +Rσ(1)c(2).
(36)
• The induction step for time t:
Assuming (26); that is,
ŝ(t+ 1) = (
∏t−1
i=1 Qσ(i) )̂s(2)+∑h=t−1
h=1
[
(
∏t−1
i=h+1Qσ(i))Wm̂(h+ 1) + (
∏t−1
i=h+1Qσ(i))Rσ(h)c(h+ 1)
]
.
(37)
then using equations (22) and (14) for s(t+ 1) we may conclude that,
ŝ(t+ 2) = Wm̂(t+ 1) +Dσ(t−1)ŝ(t+ 1) +Aσ(t−1)℘κ (̂s(t+ 1)) +Rσ(t−1)(c(t+ 1)− ẑ(t+ 1))
= (
∏t
i=1Qσ(i) )̂s(2) +
∑h=t
h=1
[
(
∏t
i=h+1Qσ(i))Wm̂(h+ 1) + (
∏t
i=h+1Qσ(i))Rσ(h)c(h+ 1)
]
(38)
Since {Qj | j ∈ [`]} is a nilpotent semigroup of matrices of index ts = n0 , and con-
sequently, for t ≥ t
s
we have (
∏t
i=1 Qσ(i))ŝ(2) = 0. Hence, using (32), for any t ≥ ts we
have
ŝ(t+ 2) =
h=t∑
h=t−ts
( t∏
i=h+1
Qσ(i))Wm̂(h+ 1) + (
t∏
i=h+1
Qσ(i))Eσ(h)F
−1
σ(h)c(h)
 . (39)
Also, since m̂(h+ 1) = m(h) then
ŝ(t+ 2) =
{
F
κ
(c(t− t
s
−m
0
), · · · , c(t)) t > m
0
,
F
κ
(m(0)t−ts · · · ,m(0)m0 , c(1), · · · , c(t)) t ≤ m0 ,
(40)
as we wanted to show. 
Example 3. An illustrative example
We consider a 3-dimensional S4σ cryptosystem with following matrices (see Equations 22
and 23) with s(t) ∈ F37, p(t) ∈ F37 and c(t) ∈ F37 and applying a simple swiching function
σ(t) = t mod 2;
Q1 =
 6 1 06 1 0
0 0 0
D1 =
 6 0 26 3 3
0 3 2
A1 =
 0 2 56 1 1
1 0 1
E1 =
 0 6 00 0 2
5 1 0
L1 =
 1 1 50 3 1
0 1 0

B1 =
 0 5 23 0 1
0 6 0
F1 =
 0 1 00 2 1
3 0 4
Q2 =
 2 5 02 5 0
0 0 0
D2 =
 0 3 52 0 4
5 4 6
A2 =
 2 6 05 0 4
3 1 1

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Figure 4: System synchronization (see Example 3)
E2 =
 3 1 01 0 1
0 1 2
L2 =
 1 6 10 0 1
0 1 0
B2 =
 1 2 00 3 1
6 1 0
F2 =
 0 3 05 0 2
1 0 0
 ,W =
 0 1 00 2 1
3 0 4
 ,
M =
 0 1 00 0 1
0 0 0

Figure 4 depicts the error vector between the p(t) (regular line) and p̂(t) (dotted line)
with s(0) = (2, 4, 1)T , ŝ(0) = (0, 2, 4)T , c = (1, 4, 4)T and m = (0, 0, 0)T . Note that when
t ≥ ts = 2 we have ŝ(t+ 1) = s(t) and after two clocks both sequences are synchronized. I
4 Security analysis
In this section we analyze the security of S4σ(P) in the LORBACPA
+ model. In what follows
we always assume that the secret key, κ, is a k-bit string. Also, U refers to the ensemble of
truly (i.e. uniformly) random permutations of Fq, while P is a pseudorandom emsemble of
permutations used in the cryptosystem S4σ(P).
Recall that S4σ(P) is said to be LORBACPA
+ secure, if for all probabilistic polynomial-
time adversaries A (as in Definition 3),
InsecLORBACPA
+
S4σ(P)
(k) = max
A
AdvLORBACPA
+
A,S4σ(P) ≤ negl(k).
Before we proceed, let us fix the setup. Assuming the existence of an adversary A in the
security model LORBACPA+, then 1 ≤ i ≤ s is the indicator of query sessions where it is
assumed that the whole number of sessions is equal to s. In this setting s
E
is the number of
query sessions initiated by the oracle E and s
SE
is the corresponding number for the oracle
SE. Similarly, ν
E
(resp. ν
SE
) is the whole number of queries asked from the oracle E within
s
E
sessions (resp. SE within s
SE
sessions).
Note that each one of ν
E
queries from E made by the adversary A consists of a pair of
equal length messages p0i,E(t) and p
1
i,E(t) as vectors in Fnq along with the vector IVi related
to initialization of session i. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ ν
E
the vector (cbi,E(τ), IVi) stands for the
answer of the oracle E to the query (p0i,E(τ),p
1
i,E(τ), IVi) = q(E, i, τ, ν) for which si(τ) is
the internal state of the oracle E simulating the encryption scheme in session i with the
memory vector mi(τ). Similarly, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ νSE the vector (cbi,SE(τ), IVi) stands
for the answer to the query (p0i,SE(τ),p
1
i,SE(τ), IVi) from the oracle SE with the internal
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state ŝi(τ) and the memory vector m̂i(τ). Recall that in this setting τ is the local counter
dedicated to each session while ν is the global query counter of the algorithm.
Also, note that for b ∈ {0, 1}, within the oracle E(IV, b) we have
cbi,E(τ + 1) = Lsi(τ) + B℘κ(si(τ)) + F℘κ(p
b
i,E(τ)), (41)
and within SE(IV, b) we have
cbi,SE(τ + 1) = Lŝi(τ + 1) + B℘κ(ŝi(τ + 1)) + F℘κ(p
b
i,SE(τ)). (42)
As an standard stage of the security proof, we first reduce the security of S4σ(P) to that of
S4σ(U) in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Considering two cryptosystems S4σ(P) and S
4
σ(U) with the same set of
parameters, then
|AdvLORBACPA+A,S4σ(P) (k)−Adv
LORBACPA+
A,S4σ(U) (k)| < negl(k).
Proof. Consider an adversary A against S4σ(P) within the setting of LORBACPA+ secu-
rity model. Using this adversary, we construct a distinguisher D, for P.
More precisely, the distinguisher D interacts with a permutation oracle Opi, that in the
beginning of the game, flips a random bit b and if b = 0, chooses a random permutation
pi ← U, while otherwise, if b = 1, the oracle chooses a permutation pi ← P.
To this end, since D uses the adversary A as a subroutine, it has to simulate the en-
vironment of the adversary A. For this, let us describe how D answers the queries made
by A. The distinguisher D runs A and has to concurrently answer the block queries used
to be answered by the oracles SE(IV, b) or E(IV, b). In detail, D works as follows (see
Algorithm 1):
Distinguisher D:
The input of D is 1k and has access to a permutation oracle Opi.
1- Initialization: D picks at random a bit b ∈ {0, 1} chosen uniformly at random and
sets Opi.
2- Running A and answering queries: D runsA, answering queries via the subroutine
LR described below.
- A feeds: A can submit queries (p0i,E(τ),p1i,E(τ), IVi) or (p0i′,SE(τ),p1i′,SE(τ), IVi′)
where i and i′ are session indicators.
- D answers: If D receives a query (p0i,E(τ),p1i,E(τ), IVi) it returns (cbi,E(τ), IVi)
toA, and if it receives a query (p0i′,SE(τ),p1i′,SE(τ), IVi′) it returns (cbi′,SE(τ), IVi′)
to A. The key points are as follows:
. If b = 1, D’s oracle uses pi ← P (a pseudorandom permutation). In this
case if D receives query (p0i,E(τ),p1i,E(τ), IVi) it always simulates the or-
acle E(IV, 1) for S4σ(P) and returns (c
b
i,E(τ), IVi) to A. Also, if a query
(p0i′,SE(τ),p
1
i′,SE(τ), IVi) is received, then SE(IV, 1) is simulated for S
4
σ(P)
and (cbi′,SE(τ), IVi′) is returned to A.
. If b = 0, D ’s oracle uses pi ← U (a truly random permutation). In this
case if D receives query (p0i,E(τ),p1i,E(τ), IVi) it always simulates the or-
acle E(IV, 0) for S4σ(U) and returns (c
b
i,E(τ), IVi) to A. Also, if a query
(p0i′,SE(τ),p
1
i′,SE(τ), IVi) is received, then SE(IV, 0) is simulated for S
4
σ(U)
and (cbi′,SE(τ), IVi′) is returned to A.
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Algorithm 1 Distinguisher D (with access to Opi)
procedure Initialize
b
$← {0, 1}
end procedure
procedure run A
b′ $← ALR
end procedure
procedure Finalization
Output 1 if b′ = b,
Output 0 otherwise.
end procedure
procedure LR(p0i,type(t),p
1
i,type(t), IVi)
if type = E then
Set E(IV, b) thanks to Opi
(p0i,E(t),p
1
i,E(t), IVi)→ E(IVi, b)
(cbi,E(t), IVi)← E(IVi, b)
return (cbi,E(t), IVi)
end if
if type = SE then
Set SE(IV, b) thanks to Opi
(p0i,SE(t),p
1
i,SE(t), IVi)→ SE(IVi, b)
(cbi,SE(t), IVi)← SE(IVi, b)
return (cbi,SE(t), IVi).
end if
end procedure
2- Final stage: Continue answering any oracle queries of A as described above, and at
the end of the game, let b′ be the output of A. Then, D outputs 1 if b = b′ and outputs
0 otherwise.
We have
AdvLORBACPA
+
A,S4σ(P) (k) = 2|Pr(output(A) = 1)−
1
2
|
= 2|Pr(b′ = b | b = 1)− 1
2
|.
and
AdvLORBACPA
+
A,S4σ(U) (k) = 2|Pr(output(A) = 1)−
1
2
|
= 2|Pr(b′ = b | b = 0)− 1
2
|.
Since we know that AdvP;D(k) is a negligible function of the security parameter k, we have
AdvP;D(k) = 2|Pr(output(D) = 1)− 1
2
|
= |Pr(b′ = b | b = 1)− Pr(b′ = b | b = 0)|
=
1
2
|AdvLORBACPA+A,S4σ(P) (k)−Adv
LORBACPA+
A,S4σ(U) (k)| < negl(k).

Let A be an adversary in the LORBACPA+ security model as a randomized algorithm
having interactions with LORBA encryption oracles E and SE. In this setting, let
(p0
1
,p1
1
, iq1
) = q1 (o1 , iq1
, τq1
, 1), (p0
2
,p1
2
, iq2
) = q2 (o2 , iq2
, τq2
, 2), . . . , (p0
r
,p1
r
, iqr ) = qr (or , iqr , τqr , r),
be the consecutive r queries that the adversary asks from its oracles, and also let
cb(1) = εθ (s(τq1
+δo1 ),p
b
1
(τq
1
)), cb(2) = εθ (s(τq2
+δo
2
),pb
2
(τq
2
)), . . . , cb(r) = εθ (s(τqr +δor ),p
b
r
(τqr )),
be the corresponding consecutive answers, with δ
SE
= 1 and δ
E
= 0. Note that in this
setting and for a fixed session i, l consecutive queries of session i can be described as
(p0
1
,p1
1
, i) = q
j1
(o
j1
, i, 1, ν
1
), (p0
2
,p1
2
, i) = q
j2
(o
j2
, i, 2, ν
2
), . . . , (p0
l
,p1
l
, i) = q
j
l
(o
j
l
, i, l, ν
l
),
where the answer to the τ ;th query q
jτ
(o
jτ
, i, τ, ν
τ
) = (p0
τ
,p1
τ
, i) is
cb(ν
τ+1
)− F℘
κ
(pb
ντ
(τ))
def
= Ψbo(c
b(ν
τ−1−µ0
), . . . , cb(ν
τ−1)), (43)
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where Ψbo is defined using Equations 41 and 42. Moreover, the probability space is generated
by the random bits used in the experiment for choosing the bit b, the key κ (containing the
information necessary to reconstruct the secret matrices and the secret random permutation)
and the initial states of the oracles
s(δo
1
), s(δo
2
), . . . , s(δor ),
as well as the random bits used by the adversary (i.e. the randomized algorithm), Also,
note that r is bounded by a polynomial of the security parameter k since the adversary is a
polynomial-time algorithm.
We define the following partial order on the sequence of queries (and consequently on
answers),
q
u
(o
u
, i
qu
, τ
qu
, ν
qu
) ≤ q
v
(o
v
, i
qv
, τ
qv
, ν
qv
) ⇔
(
i
qu
= i
qv
& τ
qu
≤ τ
qv
)
.
Note that the inequality also implies that νqu ≤ νqv where, clearly, the partial order turns
the set of queries (and consequently on answers) into a well-founded (i.e. Noetherian) set.
Now, if ν > 0, let Col
ν
be the event that for some j
1
≤ ν and j
2
≤ ν we have cb(j
1
) =
cb(j2) for some b ∈ {0, 1}. Also, define Col def= Colr .
Let ξ
def
= (c
0
, · · · , c
ν
) be fixed sequence of blocks, let q
ν
(o
ν
, i, τ, ν) be the νth query (i.e.
ν
def
= ν
τ
), define µ
0
def
= m
0
+ n
0
= m
0
+ t
s
and also let
q
ν
τ−1−µ
0
(o
ν
τ−1−µ
0
, i, τ − 1− µ
0
, ν
τ−1−µ
0
), . . . , q
ν
τ−1
(o
ν
τ−1
, i, τ − 1, ν
τ−1),
be µ
0
+ 1 of its consecutive predecessors (in the ith session) with the following vector of
answers,
%b = (cb(ντ−1−µ
0
), . . . , cb(ντ−1)).
Define H
ν
(ξ)
def
= A0
ν
(ξ) ∪A1
ν
(ξ) in which
Ab
ν
(ξ)
def
= {(x
µ
0
, · · · ,x
0
) | ∃ j ≤ ν − 1, c
j
− F℘
κ
(pb
j
) = Ψbo(x0 , · · · ,xµ
0
)}.
Our main objective in what follows is to prove that not only the probability of the event
Col is negligible but also the probability of success for the adversary conditioned to having
no collision is also a negligible function of the security parameter. Formally, we have to
prove the following statements.
Proposition 2. Let A be an adversary for S4σ(U) within the setting of LORBACPA+
security model. Then for any b ∈ {0, 1} there exist a negligible function negl
0
such that
a) Pr0(output(A) = 1|Col) = Pr1(output(A) = 1|Col).
b) Pr0(Col) = Pr1(Col).
c) Prb(Col) ≤ negl0(k).
Proof. (a)⇒ For this part, let ξ def= (c
0
, · · · , c
ν
) be fixed sequence of answers, let q
ν
(o
ν
, i, τ, ν)
be the νth query (i.e. ν
def
= ν
τ
) and also let
q
ν
τ−1−µ
0
(o
ν
τ−1−µ
0
, i, τ − 1− µ
0
, ν
τ−1−µ0
), . . . , q
ν
τ−1
(o
ν
τ−1
, i, τ − 1, ν
τ−1),
be µ
0
= t
s
+m of its consecutive predecessors (in the ith session) with the following vector
of answers,
%b = (cb(ντ−1−µ
0
), . . . , cb(ντ−1)).
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Let ξ′ def= (c
ν
τ−1−µ
0
, · · · , c
ν
τ−1
). We use well-founded induction to prove that for any ν we
have
Pr0(%
0 = ξ′|Col
ν
) = Pr1(%
1 = ξ′|Col
ν
).
Since the distribution of the initial states, and consequently, the answers to the first queries
are uniformly distributed the base of the well-founded induction holds.
For induction step, note that,
Prb,Colν
(%b = ξ′) = Prb,Colν (%
b = ξ′|ξ′ ∈ H
ν
(ξ))Prb,Colν
(ξ′ ∈ H
ν
(ξ))+
Prb,Colν
(%b = ξ′|ξ′ 6∈ Hν (ξ))Prb,Colν (ξ
′ 6∈ Hν (ξ))
First, note that the event ξ′ ∈ H
ν
(ξ) does not depend on b, since the size of the set H
ν
(ξ)
does not depend on b. On the other hand, ξ′ ∈ H
ν
(ξ) implies the event Col
ν
, indicating
that the first term in the sum is equal to zero. Also, the union of Col
ν−1 and ξ
′ 6∈ H
ν
(ξ) is
equal to Colν , hence
Prb,Colν
(%b = ξ′|ξ′ 6∈ H
ν
(ξ)) = Prb(%
b = ξ′|Col
ν−1),
that does not depend on b by induction hypothesis.
(b) ⇒ For this case, we use well-founded induction to prove that for any ν we have
Pr0(Colν ) = Pr1(Colν ). Note that the equality is trivially true for the minimal elements
(corresponding to the initial states).
Within the same setting as in Part(a), for any b ∈ {0, 1} we have,
Prb(Colν ) = Prb(Colν |Colν−1)Prb(Colν−1) + Prb(Colν |Colν−1)Prb(Colν−1).
Since Prb(Colν |Colν−1) = 1, by induction the first term of the sum is independent of b.
Hence, by induction, it suffices to prove that Prb(Colν |Colν−1) is independent of b. But,
Prb(Colν |Colν−1) =
∑
ξ′
Prb(Colν |Colν−1 & %b = ξ′)Prb(%b = ξ′|Colν−1).
In each term, The second component is independent of the bit b by the proof of part (a).
For the first term, note that the probability only depends on the vectors cb(ντ+1) satisfying
Equation 43. But, since the initial states are uniformly chosen random vectors, the matrix
W and for any j ∈ [`], the matrices Lj ,Fj are uniformly chosen random invertible matrices,
and ℘
κ
is a uniformly chosen random permutation, the distributions of vectors F−1σ(h)(c(h)),
F−1σ(h)c(h), Wm(h), Wm̂(h + 1), Lsi(τ), Lŝi(τ + 1), and F℘κ(p
b
ντ
(τ)) are the same, and
consequently, by Equations 41, 42 and 43 the probability Prb(Colν |Colν−1 & %b = ξ′) does
not depend on b (see Section 5 for a discussion on this part).
(c) ⇒ For this part note that,
Prb(Col) ≤
r∑
ν=2
Prb(Colν |Colν−1).
But considering Part (b) we know that c
ν
is uniformly distributed,
Prb(Col) ≤
r∑
ν=2
Prb(Colν |Colν−1) ≤
r∑
ν=2
2(ν − 1)
qn
≤ 2r22−k,
which is a negligible function of k since r is bounded by a polynomial function of k.

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Clearly, using Proposition 2 one may prove the main security result as follows.
Theorem 1. The self-synchronized stream cipher S4σ(P) is LORBACPA
+ secure.
Proof. By Proposition 1 it suffices to prove the claim for S4σ(U). For this we have
AdvLORBACPA
+
A,S4σ(U)
(k) = Pr1(output(A) = 1)− Pr0(output(A) = 1)
= Pr1(output(A) = 1 | Col1)Pr1(Col1) + Pr1(output(A) = 1 | Col1)Pr1(Col1)
−Pr0(output(A) = 1 | Col0)Pr0(Col0)− Pr0(output(A) = 1 | Col0)Pr0(Col0)
=
(
Pr1(output(A) = 1 | Col1)− Pr0(output(A) = 1 | Col0)
)
negl
0
(k)
≤ negl′(κ).
Consequently, we obtain
AdvLORBACPA
+
A,S4σ(P) (k) ≤ Adv
LORBACPA+
A,S4σ(U) (k) + negl
′(k)
≤ negl(k).

5 Concluding remarks
In this article we introduced the security model LORBACPA+ for self-synchronized stream
ciphers which is stronger than the traditional blockwise LOR-IND-CPA, and based on con-
tributions of G. Mille´rioux et.al., we introduced a new self-synchronized stream cipher S4σ(P)
which is secure in this stronger model. It is instructive to note that the main idea giving
rise to this stronger security property is the fact that in the new setup which is based on
control theoretic unknown input observer design for the receiver, one is able to use totally
random initial state vectors for encryption.
It is also interesting to have a control-theoretic view to our security proof as an uncon-
trolability result. From this point of view, an adversary is a stochastic discrete dynamical
system gaining information from the answers it receives to its queries as control-inputs.
Hence, the aim of the adversary is to make collisions for the answers since having no colli-
sion gives rise to a no-information state because of the uniform distribution of the answers
(as a consequence of the uniform distribution of the initial states of the oracles and sys-
tem secret parameters). This can be thought of as a game in which the adversary tries to
make collisions while in the state of a self-avoiding walk (i.e. no collision) of this dynamical
system, the adversary gains no information about b. Therefore, the whole scenario is to
control the system for the objective of maximizing the probability of a collision (hopefully
to become noticeable), where from this point of view, security can be interpreted as an
uncontrolability property. In this setting, a simple intuition supporting our security proof is
based on the facts that being able to choose i.i.d random vectors for the initial states of the
oracles guaranties that different oracles have independent trajectories, while the fact that
the length of runs (i.e. walks) of each oracle is bounded by a polynomial function of the
security parameter (since the adversary is a polynomial-time algorithm) and the fact that
each step of the run as an n-dimensional vector has an exponential number of possibilities,
makes sure that the probability of a collision is bounded by a negligible function of the
security parameter.
Let us also add a couple of comments on practical issues. First, note that Part (b) of
Proposition 2 is still valid even if only the matrix L and the permutation ℘
κ
are secretly cho-
sen uniformly at random, however, since in practice, and in particular for small parameters
used in a lightweight setting, real simulations fail to completely satisfy theoretical assump-
tions we have also added the matrices F and W to the secret parameters of the ciphersystem
to ensure uniform randomization mixing (see Equations 41 and 42). On the other hand, we
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would like to mention that from a practical point of view, our ciphersystem is as close as
to a CCA secure streamcipher while it still is error-resistant and self-synchronized, which in
our opinion, makes it more applicable in comparison to a CCA secure stream cipher along
with a synchronizer, at least in noisy environments.
Naturally, more practical issues and applications concerning the implementation of this
new streamcipher should be the subject of further investigations.
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